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The relationship between the sporting governing bodies and the EU authorities has long 
been a tumultuous one. Sporting governing bodies have supported most of their 
controversial decisions on the doctrine of the specificity of sports, under which it has been 
hard to define a threshold for the legality of their actions. The introduction of Article 165 
TFEU in 2009 and several prominent case law by the CJEU has helped to sustain this 
unique sui generis status of lex sportiva in the EU. In this context, the financial issues for 
clubs have arisen as one of the main topics in this controversial matter. This thesis seeks to 
embrace the specific issue of players’ salaries in European football leagues, which have 
considerably increased in the recent past, and the acceptance of salary caps by EU law. 
Players’ salaries represent the largest component of operating costs to club owners and 
salary caps place a limit on the amount of money that a club can spend on players’ salaries. 
Salary caps are a unique area for social, economic and legal studies, and its impact has 
been widely acknowledged. This thesis provides a legal assessment on the current structure 
of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations, with the break-even rule being considered as a 
soft type of salary cap, as well as a legal assessment on the eventual introduction of a hard 
salary cap. It concludes that the current Financial Fair Play Regulations are most likely in 
breach of EU law and that a hard salary cap will be a better candidate to qualify for an 
exemption under EU law and be deemed as legal. Nevertheless, it also concludes that the 
commonly known US hard salary caps are in fact soft types of salary caps and that the 
introduction of a truly hard salary cap in European football would be an innovative 
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The relationship between finance and football is more relevant today than it has ever 
been. In the last couple of years, many clubs have reported catastrophic economic results, 
with deficits reaching unprecedented levels, even though football has been generating 
record revenues, with sports leagues having a major role in this regard. 
In September 2009, to confront the threat of financial instability for clubs and 
competitions, the Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA)’s Executive 
Committee approved the Financial Fair Play (FFP) model, which was finally approved by 
UEFA in 2010 and integrated into the club licensing regulations.1 The Financial Fair Play 
Regulations (FFPR), a system of financial regulations that seeks to improve overall 
financial health of European club football2, introduced the break-even requirement, a rule 
that is considered to be the cornerstone of the FFPR3, which requests that clubs should live 
within their own means.4 According to the break-even requirement, a club must be able to 
demonstrate that its relevant income balances with its relevant expenditure.5 
These FFPR, however, have been suggested to raise concerns of compliance with 
European Union (EU) law, most significantly competition law issues and internal market 
issues, in a struggle that seems to have no near end at sight. In particular, FFPR’s break-
even requirement could be considered as a soft type of salary cap6, fostering the increasing 
dispute between lex sportiva7 and EU law. 
In sports, the concept of “salary cap” is defined by the European Commission as “a 
limit on the amount of money a team can spend on player salaries, either as a per-player 
limit or a total limit for the team's roster (or both)”.8 Salary caps are common in 
professional sports leagues around the world, including sports such as American football, 
                                                      
1 UEFA, Club licensing: Ten years on, Nyon, UEFA, 2015a, at 9. 
2 PEETERS; SZYMANSKI, “Financial fair play in European football”, 2014, at 352. 
3 FRANCK, “Financial Fair Play in European Club Football - What is it all about?”, 2014, at 3. 
4 Ibid. 
5 PEETERS; SZYMANSKI (2014), at 3. 
6 LINDHOLM, “The problem with salary caps under European Union Law: the case against financial fair 
play”, 2010, at 190. 
7 SERBY, “The state of EU sports law: lessons from UEFA’s ‘Financial Fair Play’ regulations”, 2016, at 38-
39: “The phrase ‘lex sportiva’ has been coined to describe the element of sporting self-regulation whereby 
the sporting world has carved a niche private legal order separate and apart from national, EU and 
international law”. 
8 Commission Staff Working Document, The EU and sport: background and context, Accompanying 





baseball, basketball, hockey, rugby and Australian football.9 Nevertheless, salary caps have 
been uncommon in European sports.10 
Salary caps have been part of US professional sports for a long time.11 Nowadays, 
three of the four American major sports leagues have team salary caps: the National 
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), and the National 
Hockey League (NHL). The Major League Baseball (MLB) is the only of these four major 
leagues that doesn’t have some form of salary cap.12 However, this league (and also NBA) 
has a luxury tax13, a related concept which could be considered a soft salary cap as it 
discourages salary increases.14 
It is important to note that most salary caps, as US salary caps, are payroll caps. 
Nevertheless, in this thesis, a broader salary cap approach is adopted to include all 
measures that limit how much money a club can spend on player salaries.15 FFPR, and 
specifically the break-even requirement, do not stipulate a fixed maximum amount that 
clubs may spend on salaries. However, these rules “have the same effect and purpose as 
salary caps in other leagues: to limit how much money clubs can spend on player 
salaries”.16 
The main purpose of the thesis is to assess the legality of UEFA’s break-even 
requirement, usually deemed as a soft type of salary cap, and to understand to what point 
the introduction of a hard salary cap would add some sort of benefit to the current rules, 
considering EU law. 
As such, this work strongly relies on a comparative approach between the United 
States (US) and the European models for sports. FFPR have raised several EU law 
(in)compatibility issues and the eventual introduction of an American type of salary cap in 
European football surely adds to the debate. This has been a hot topic in the recent past due 
to the acknowledgeable fact that FFPR have failed to be fully effective and are legally 
                                                      
9 BARTLETT; GRATTON; ROLF, Encyclopedia of international sports studies: volume 3 P-Z, 2006, at 
1170. 
10 LINDHOLM (2010), at 190. 
11 Ibid., at Abstract. 
12 Ibid., at note 1. 
13 According to DIETL; LANG; WERNER, “The effect of luxury taxes on competitive balance, club profits, 
and social welfare in sports leagues”, 2008, at 2: “A luxury tax, or competitive balance tax, is a surcharge on 
the aggregate payroll of a sports team that exceeds a predetermined limit set by the corresponding sports 
league”. 
14 KESENNE, “The salary cap proposal of the G14 in European football”, 2003. 
15 As LINDHOLM (2010). 
16






This thesis is organized in five parts. The first part presents the origins of salary caps 
in North American professional sports leagues, as an integral part of a labor relations 
approach, the hard and the soft types of US salary caps, their impact on the competitive 
balance and the legal framework in US. 
The second part consists of a comparison between the European and the North 
American models for sports, both describing their differences and some similarities. 
In the third part of this work, an assessment on FFPR is provided, with a specific 
focus on the transnational legal issues involved in Europe. An overview of FFPR is 
initially provided, followed by a legal assessment on the validity of the break-even rule as 
a soft type of salary cap, under EU Competition Law and the EU Internal Market rules on 
free movement. The European Commission’s position is then assessed, as well as the 
relevant legal challenges on FFPR, to this date. 
In the fourth part of this work, the compatibility of introducing a hard salary cap in 
European football is assessed, both regarding EU Competition Law and the EU Internal 
Market rules on free movement, bearing in mind the exercise provided on the previous 
chapter. As such, it will be assessed in this chapter whether the introduction of a hard 
salary cap would more easily be exempted from the scope of EU law when compared to 
the current soft type of salary cap, the break-even requirement. 
Finally, in the fifth and final part, some personal remarks and a conclusion are 
presented on what the future could uphold for salary caps in European football. 
2. SALARY CAPS IN NORTH AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES 
2.1. Foundations of Salary Caps 
The first salary cap in professional North American sports was introduced by the 
NBA in the 1984-1985 season17, under an agreement reached in 198318, included in that 
year’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The second league of the four major 
leagues to adopt a salary cap was the NFL in 199419, under an agreement reached in 
1993.20 The NHL instituted a salary cap in its 2005 CBA.21 
                                                      
17 STAUDOHAR, “Salary caps in professional team sports”, 1998, at 3. 
18 WONG, Essentials of Sports Law, 2010, at 549. 
19 STAUDOHAR (1998), at 3. 





Until the mid-1970s, salaries in the major North American Professional sporting 
leagues were constrained by “reserve clauses”, “the club’s right to renew a contract for a 
one-year period under the same terms and conditions as the previous year of the 
contract”22, except, eventually, the salary. However, at that time, various courts’ rulings 
and negotiated agreements brought changes that led to the beginning of a new era of free 
agency.23 Free agency resulted in an unprecedented rise in players’ salaries.24 
Salary caps emerged in these major leagues with the introduction of free agency and 
were set as a counterforce to the free movement of players.25 
2.2. Salary Caps and the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Salary caps are negotiated in the league’s CBA. The US CBA is a negotiated 
agreement that governs the relationship between employers and their employees.26 
In sports, like in many other industries, unions represent the collective interests of 
employees. Athletes whose employers are the NBA, the NFL, the NHL, the MLB or the 
MLS (Major League Soccer), are unionized.27 In North America, unions were relativity 
weak until the 1950s. They started to grow at that time and have grown significantly over 
the years.28 In North America’s professional sports leagues, one could say that CBAs 
create a binding system of laws and guidelines that govern the relationship between 
managements and unions.29 
The collective bargaining (the process) and the CBA (the agreement) are extremely 
relevant in professional sports leagues and are usually the basis for determining the 
parameters of several matters, including salary caps, luxury taxes, free agency and salary 
arbitration.30 Players’ unions and owners are constantly negotiating these league policies 
and the conflicts between them have led to labor disputes and work stoppages, which 
                                                                                                                                                                   
21 Ibid., at 560. 
22 WONG (2010), at 847. 
23 BARTLETT; GRATTON; ROLF (2006), at 1170. 
24 Ibid. 
25 DIETL; DUSCHL; LANG, “Executive pay regulation: what regulators, shareholders, and managers can 
learn from major sports leagues”, 2011, at 5. 
26 CHAMPION, Fundamentals of Sports Law, 2004, at chapter 18:2. 
27 ROSNER; SHROPSHIRE, The Business of Sports, 2011, at 299. 
28 SZYMANSKI, “The economic design of sporting contests”, 2003, at note 37. 






include strikes and lockouts. The salary cap has been the center of significant labor unrest 
since the 1980s.31 
2.3. Types of Salary Caps 
A distinction should be made with respect to the severity of the cap between hard and 
soft salary caps.32 According to Staudohar, implementing a hard salary cap means that 
clubs are not allowed to spend more than the established salary cap and exceptions are not 
allowed, while implementing a soft salary cap means that it is possible for clubs to exceed 
the cap under certain conditions.33 
Regarding the types of salary caps in US professional sports leagues, the NBA has a 
soft salary with numerous exceptions to the cap.34 The NFL and the NHL have salary caps 
that have been named as hard salary caps. However, these caps also present several 
exceptions. The MLS has a salary cap with several exceptions. An example is the 
Designated Player Rule, adopted in the 2007 MLS season. This rule allows MLS clubs to 
exceed the salary cap to pursue high-profile players.35 
As such, one should conclude in this regard that none of the major US professional 
sports leagues actually has a hard salary cap system implemented. While interviewing 
Professor Rodney Fort36 for the purposes of this thesis, he has confirmed that from an 
economic perspective none of the salary caps in the US professional sports leagues are 
hard salary caps.37 He stated that, in fact, “in the US, the cap is pretty weak”. He also 
stated that “from the original design of US salary caps, there were exceptions”. Fort 
considers that this is because “nobody wanted a hard salary cap” in US professional sports 
leagues. In that regard, he considers that salary caps in the US are payroll caps to deal with 
the “difference on revenues of teams”. 
2.4. Salary Caps and Competitive Balance 
Competitive balance is an important topic and a widely used concept in the literature 
of professional team sports. According to Fort and Winfree, “the basic idea of competitive 
                                                      
31 WONG (2010), at 559. 
32 DIETL; DUSCHL; LANG (2011), at 22. 
33 STAUDOHAR (1998), at 4-5. 
34 NBA, “CBA 101: Highlights of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA)”, 2014, at 5-8. 
35 BERNHARD, “MLS’ Designated Player Rule: Has David Beckham Single-Handedly Destroyed Major 
League Soccer’s Single-Entity Antitrust Defense?”, 2007, at 425. 
36 Rodney Fort is Professor of Sport Management at the University of Michigan, School of Kinesiology. He 
is internationally recognized as an authority on sports economics. 





balance is that teams are equal in terms of team quality, so that every team has about the 
same chance to win”.38 Clubs in a sports league must be not too strong or too weak relative 
to one another so that the uncertainty of the outcome is preserved.39 
There is currently a debate between scholars about the importance and the benefits of 
competitive balance. According to Zimbalist, “competitive balance is like wealth. 
Everyone agrees it is a good thing to have, but no one knows how much one needs”.40 
Economic theory has posed serious doubt on the relationship between salary caps 
and competitive balance. According to Fort and Winfree “the policy devices used in the 
name of competitive balance (1) theoretically cannot change balance, and (2) actually have 
not changed balance, by looking at the data”.41 These authors affirmed that the only tool 
that could actually change balance in a significant way would be the introduction of a hard 
salary cap. However, this would be an innovative solution as US salary caps are not truly 
hard.42 Accordingly, Staudohar affirmed that if a salary cap was enforced as a hard cap, the 
difference could be greater because this would apply as a direct limit.43 The author 
concludes that “salary caps and payroll taxes may seem beneficial to owners, but their 
effects appear to be more symbolic and cosmetic than fundamental”.44 
2.5. The Legal Framework 
Historically, antitrust law has been applied to professional sports leagues in the US, 
namely the NFL, the NBA and the NHL, but not to the MLB. In Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs
45, the Supreme Court 
famously ruled that organized baseball did not fall within the scope of antitrust law.46 The 
basic federal antitrust law, the Sherman Antitrust Act, was enacted by the Congress in 
1890.47 In 1914, the Congress approved two additional antitrust laws: The Federal Trade 
Commission Act and the Clayton Act. With some amendments, these are the three-core 
federal antitrust laws still in effect as of today. 
                                                      
38 FORT; WINFREE, 15 sports myths and why they’re wrong, 2013, at 191. 
39 QUIRK; FORT, Pay dirt: The business of professional team sports, 1997, at 243. 
40 ZIMBALIST, “Competitive balance in sports leagues: an introduction”, 2002, at 111. 
41 FORT; WINFREE (2013), at 206. 
42 Ibid., at 206. 
43 STAUDOHAR (1998), at 10. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 
(1922). 
46 NAFZIGER, “A comparison of the European and North American models of sports organisation”, 2008, 
107. 





Labor and collective bargaining law is also a crucial feature for North American 
professional sports.48 As previously mentioned, in the US, restraints on teams and players, 
such as salary caps, are largely premised in labor agreements within the scope of CBAs. 
Indeed, under US sports law, antitrust law and labor law are very much related, 
although these two areas of law have an inherent conflict49: antitrust law promotes 
competition and condemns cooperation among competitors, while labor law encourages 
cooperation among competitors in employment.50 According to Nafziger, although 
restraints on a market such as the sports industry may breach U.S. antitrust law, two 
antitrust law labor exemptions remove certain restraints on labor from this general policy: 
the statutory exemption and the non-statutory exemption.51 
The “statutory labor exemption” was created under sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton 
Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.52 Section 6 of the Clayton Act declares that “The labor 
of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce”53 and provides that the 
antitrust laws do not prohibit labor organizations.54 The Norris-LaGuardia Act and Section 
20 of the Clayton Act limit the ability of federal courts to enjoin certain labor-related 
activities.55 The Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to protect unilateral union 
conduct from antitrust challenges.56 However, the statutory exemption only protected a 
labor organization’s unilateral actions and not the agreements between unions and 
nonlabor parties. As such, it did not immunize the collective bargaining process or the 
CBA’s themselves from potential antitrust liability.57 
Later, in 1965, the US Supreme Court developed a judicially formulated addition to 
the statutory exemption, commonly referred to as the “non-statutory labor exemption”58. 
According to Feldman, «the Court held that “some restraints on competition imposed 
through the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions . . . to give effect 
                                                      
48 NAFZIGER (2008), at 105. 
49 FELDMAN, “Antitrust versus Labor Law in professional sports: balancing the scales after Brady v. NFL 
and Anthony v. NBA”, 2011, at 1223. 
50 FELDMAN (2011), at 1227. 
51 NAFZIGER (2008), at 103. 
52 FELDMAN (2011), at 1228. 
53 CLAYTON ACT, 15 US Code, 2006, § 17. 
54 FELDMAN (2011), at 1228. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., at 1229. 





to federal labor laws and policies and to allow meaningful collective bargaining to take 
place”».59 
These exemptions have been the heart of nearly all antitrust actions in professional 
sports. Nevertheless, as stated by Nafziger, it is worth mentioning that they have not 
always been applied consistently.60 
3. THE EUROPEAN AND THE NORTH AMERICAN MODELS OF SPORTS 
There are legal, cultural and social differences between the European and the North 
American sports’ structures. Baseball, basketball, hockey and American football are the 
most popular sports in the US, while in Europe the most important sport usually is 
European football. Nevertheless, there are other relevant differences, namely different 
models of sports, which make European and US sports realities very different. 
Firstly, the existence of voluntary clubs and associations in Europe (club structure) 
versus educational institutions such as schools, colleges and universities in the US (school 
structure).61 
Secondly, the existence of associations as part of globally operating federations in 
Europe (association structure) versus franchises typically associated to personally owned 
businesslike leagues in the US (commercial structure).62 
Thirdly, US professional sports are organized in closed leagues of competition, 
where the entry of new franchises or franchise relocation (the franchises have an exclusive 
territory63) is common and a purely commercial decision.64 On the other hand, both 
amateur and professional leagues in Europe are built as open competitions, based on the 
principle of promotion and relegation65, where clubs may move up or down yearly 
depending on their standing at the end of a season.66 
Furthermore, North American professional sports leagues are nationally oriented. In 
contrast, European professional sports leagues are internationally oriented.67 
                                                      
59 FELDMAN (2011), at 1230. 
60 NAFZIGER (2008), at 103. 
61 VAN BOTTENBURG, Maarten, “Why are the European and American Sports Worlds so Different? Path-
dependence in European and American Sports History”, 2011, at 1. 
62 VAN BOTTENBURG (2011), at 4. 
63 PEETERS; SZYMANSKI (2014), at 348. 
64 BARROS; IBRAHÍMO; SZYMANSKI, “Transatlantic sport: an introduction”, 2002, at 2. 
65 VAN BOTTENBURG (2011), at 1. 
66 NAFZIGER (2008), at 101. 





Also, US’s professional leagues are organized and professionalized quite 
independently of the rest of the international sporting scene68, whereas in Europe sports is 
traditionally organized in a pyramidal structure with four interdependent levels of 
professional and nonprofessional organizations.69 Regarding football (soccer), one could 
say that the governance model of European football is hierarchical. The international 
governing bodies, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and UEFA, 
sit at the top of the pyramid. FIFA is the world’s football governing body. UEFA is the 
governing body of football in Europe and is an umbrella organization for 55 national 
football associations across Europe.70 
Another relevant difference is that US sports clubs were established under profit-
oriented managerial control (profit maximizers), without any international regulatory body. 
On the contrary, in Europe, clubs are governed by international non-profit federations.71 
In addition, the European sports model is based on the importance of regional 
identity and of national identity. However, this feature can be problematic due to the 
national rivalries that could take the form of spectator violence, intolerance, hooliganism or 
even racism.72 In the US, this negative feature is mostly absent. 
One should conclude that there are fundamental differences in the US and the 
European sports structures. However, there are increasingly relevant similarities due to the 
trends of globalization that continue both sides of the Atlantic, accelerating the 
convergence of the US and the EU sports structures at all levels.73 This idea should be 
highlighted when eventually transplanting a typical US salary cap to the European 
structure. 
4. FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL 
4.1. Introduction 
Football is the most popular sport in Europe and in the world. Football governance 
was initially organized at the national level through national federations or associations. 
Later, international organizations such as FIFA (founded in 1904) and UEFA (founded in 
                                                      
68 Ibid., at 11. 
69 NAFZIGER (2008), at 100. 
70 UEFA, About UEFA. Retrieved from http://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/index.html 
71 VAN BOTTENBURG (2011), at 1. 
72 NAFZIGER (2008), at 102. 





1954) were founded.74 In Europe, there are many big clubs, world class players, high 
players’ salaries and the income for big clubs has been increasing. Nevertheless, the 
financial state of European professional clubs seems to have deteriorated with many clubs 
suffering from financial crises. In 2008, UEFA’s President Michel Platini stated that “the 
many clubs across Europe that continue to operate on a sustainable basis […] are finding it 
increasingly hard to coexist and compete with clubs that incur costs and transfer fees 
beyond their means and report losses year-after-year”.75 
In 2010, in this context of debt growing due to overinvestment by several clubs, 
UEFA announced a set of regulations, known as FFPR, intended to introduce more 
discipline and rationality to European football clubs’ finances.76 Several scholars have 
supported that overinvestment by clubs was the main reason for the introduction of the 
FFPR.77 The idea under the overinvestment theory is that clubs are currently overspending 
on player salaries, which could ultimately lead to their bankruptcy. Consequently, this 
would put at stake the stability of the remaining clubs and the existing competitions. 
Szymanski has considered insolvency as an endemic problem for European Football.78 
However, the overinvestment theory has been deemed as inconsistent in the past and 
lacking concrete data analysis.79 As such, as will later be assessed, this raises issues 
regarding the legality of FFPR. 
4.2. An Overview 
The FFP model was approved in September 2009 by UEFA's Executive Committee, 
which also created the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) to oversee its 
implementation.80 The FFP concept “has centered on the obligations for clubs, over a 
period of time, to balance their books or break even”.81 
The main objectives of FFPR can be summarized by analyzing Article 2(2) of FFPR, 
which states that the aim of these regulations is to achieve FFP in UEFA club competitions 
                                                      
74 MARKS, «UEFA, the EU and Financial Fair Play: “On ne dépense pas plus d'argent que l'on n'en 
génère!”», 2012, at 54. 
75 UEFA, The European Footballing Landscape: Club licensing benchmarking report financial year 2008, 
2008, Foreword. 
76 PEETERS; SZYMANSKI (2014), at 345. 
77 CHAPLIN, “Financial fair play protects football’s stability”, 27 May 2010; ARNAUT, Independent 
European Sport Review, A report by José Luis Arnaut, 2006; or LINDHOLM (2010), for instance. 
78 SZYMANSKI, “Insolvency in English professional football: Irrational exuberance or negative shocks?”, 
2012, 1-36. 
79 LINDHOLM (2010), at 207. 
80 UEFA (2015a), at 9. 





through: improving the economic and financial capability of clubs (increasing their 
transparency and credibility); placing the necessary importance on the protection of 
creditors and ensuring that clubs settle their liabilities with players, tax/social authorities 
and other clubs punctually; introducing more discipline and rationality in club football 
finances; encouraging clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; encouraging 
responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; and protecting the long-term 
viability and sustainability of European football.82 
A key feature and the most controversial aspect of the FFPR is the break-even 
requirement, a rule stipulated in Articles 58-64 of the FFPR83 that requires clubs to balance 
their spending with their revenues, as well as restricts clubs from accumulating debt.84 The 
break-even requirement is set according to a complex set of criteria and should result in a 
balanced spending and revenues outcome, which are calculated over a three-year period. 
The balance is subject to an acceptable deviation of €5 million. On the income side, gate 
receipts, TV revenues, advertising, merchandising, transfers of players, prize money and 
disposal of tangible fixed assets are taken in consideration. On the outgoings side, the 
purchase of players, employee benefits and wages, amortization of transfers, finance costs 
and dividends are considered.85 Clubs not meeting these requirements face a range of 
sanctions applied by the CFCB, which could include the withholding of prize money (as it 
occurred with Sporting Clube de Portugal in 201286), player transfer bans (as it occurred 
with FC Barcelona in 201487), fines or even disqualification from UEFA’s competitions. 
For UEFA, since the implementation of the FFPR, significant results have been 
achieved.88 Overall, overdue payables have decreased and aggregate losses have been 
cut.89 
4.3. FFPR, Lex Sportiva and EU Law 
It will now be assessed to what point these regulations raise concerns of 
compatibility with EU law. The question of whether FFPR are compatible with EU law 
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falls under a wider problem of the extent of the autonomy of sports governance, and to 
what point should it be covered by EU law. 
4.3.1. FFPR and the Special Status of Lex Sportiva 
Lex sportiva is a concept that “refers to the arrangements that define a sport´s 
operation”.90 According to Weatherill, lex sportiva is “made up of the rules and practices 
established by governing bodies and applied globally to ensure common treatment of a 
particular sport wherever it happens to be played”.91 It is not a law of a State and may 
come into conflict with the law of any State or with the law of an international 
organization, such as the EU.92 
The emergence of EU sports law has its origins trace back to 1974 with the Walrave 
case.93 In this landmark case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that 
“the practice of sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an 
economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty”.94 In 1995, Bosman also 
provided a landmark decision in which the CJEU ruled that transfer regulations represented 
an obstacle to a fundamental freedom, and therefore they had to be justified.95 As Stephen 
Weatherill stated, the decision represented a shift from the test laid down in Walrave 
because the CJEU did not assess whether the transfer regulations were a purely sporting 
rule.96 In Walrave, purely sporting rules were considered exempt from the scope of EU 
law. In Bosman, Advocate General Lenz had a particularly important perspective in this 
regard when he stated that professional football was “substantially different from other 
markets in that the clubs are mutually dependent on each other”.97 He also stated that some 
restrictions could be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the sports industry.98 
Later, in Meca-Medina, the CJEU clarified its position by referring that it was “apparent 
that the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of 
removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that 
rule or the body which has laid it down”.99 As such, one can conclude that Meca-Medina 
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was crucial to comprehend the CJEU’s stand that sporting rules should not be granted 
immediate immunity from the scope of EU law.100 
Since then, lex sportiva has gained a special status according to International, 
European and national laws. A clear evidence is Article 165(1) of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), introduced in 2009, which states that “the 
Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account 
of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and 
educational function”.101 Thus, there is an inherent conflict (and a crossover area) between 
the laws of states and supranational authorities, and lex sportiva and sports authorities. 
Article 165 TFEU was introduced as a formal but weak treaty competence for sports, 
which could be considered as “soft law”. As such, it leaves open room for policy 
developments within the EU sports field. One must agree with García and Weatherill when 
they state that including a specific sporting competence in the Lisbon Treaty, with 
reference to the specificity of sports, had the purpose of helping to “preserve sport’s 
autonomy, rather than because of any belief that the EU should assume a more active 
regulatory role”. These authors refer this strategy as a method of “empowering the EU in 
order to restrain it”.102 Richard Parrish believes that “while EU sports law recognizes a 
territory of sporting self-regulation governed by the lex sportiva, it conditions this 
autonomy on the acceptance of the integration of general principles of law into the lex 
sportiva – such as proportionality and good governance”.103 This would help to make a 
case for the doctrine of the specificity of sports, further developed by the CJEU’s rulings 
and the positions assumed by the European Commission. 
EU law has been especially aggressive to the autonomy of sports authorities. To 
Weatherill, for instance, FFPR are “legally fragile” and vulnerable to challenges under EU 
law, as they fall into a grey regulatory area, inherent to the concept of soft law.104 
Therefore, it is for a competent judicial authority, such as the CJEU, to decide on the 
validity of these Regulations and its future in a case-by-case assessment. 
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4.3.2. FFPR and EU Competition Law 
The strongest concern raised by the critics of FFPR is the idea that FFPR are in 
breach of EU Competition Law, more specifically Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as FFPR 
could constitute unnecessary anti-competitive agreements (Article 101 TFEU) or result in 
the abuse of a dominant position in the market (Article 102 TFEU), depending on whether 
UEFA’s structure is to be considered horizontal or vertical in the market, by nature. 
The anti-competitive effect of salary caps has been a long-debated issue in the US, 
with issues raising regarding the application of the Sherman Act. The most relevant 
antitrust provisions in the fields of sports for the Sherman Act are Section 1, regarding 
Restraint of Trade, and Section 2, regarding Monopolization. As Lindholm identified, in 
the field of sports, the Sherman Act rationale is very similar to the EU Competition Law 
provisions.105 
4.3.2.1. Article 101 TFEU 
Article 101 TFEU is the provision that raises the most complicated legal issues in 
several scholars’ opinions. For instance, in Weatherill’s opinion, FFPR could be a 
horizontal agreement between suppliers of sports services (in this case, clubs), which 
involves commitments restraining the spending, such as players’ wages. This is also 
strengthened by vertical restraints enforced by UEFA (licensing requirements). FFPR also 
appear to be a restriction on the competition to acquire players, as clubs have reduced their 
investments, which subsequently affects players’ salaries, depressing the levels of 
remuneration.106 From an economic perspective, Peeters and Szymanski have assessed that 
FFPR are a form of market restraint and through a structural empirical model have proved 
that they substantially reduce competition, having as a consequence “lower average 
payrolls, while average revenues would hardly be affected”.107 
4.3.2.1.1. Undertaking/Association of Undertakings 
At this stake, it’s rather important to point out that for EU competition rules to apply, 
UEFA must be considered either an undertaking or an association of undertakings. The 
term “undertaking” has been given a broad interpretation by the CJEU. Piau108 appears as 
                                                      
105 LINDHOLM (2010), at 197. 
106 WEATHERILL (2017), at 274. 
107 PEETERS; SZYMANSKI, “Vertical restraints in soccer: Financial Fair Play and the English Premier 
League”, 2012, at 1. 





an especially important landmark case in this regard, as the CJEU considered that the 
national football associations, which are groups of football clubs to whom football is an 
economic activity, are associations of undertakings under the meaning of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU. Also, international sporting federations are to be considered as undertakings 
and associations of undertakings. In Meca-Medina, the Commission concluded that the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) constituted an association of undertakings.109 
Therefore, one can conclude that FIFA, UEFA, and its member clubs, as entities engaged 
in economic activities, are to be considered as undertakings and associations of 
undertakings and are under the scope of the Treaty’s provisions regarding agreements that 
restrict competition. 
4.3.2.1.2. Concerted Practice/Decision which Affects Trade 
The next step for an undertaking/association of undertakings to fall under the scope 
of EU Competition Law is that it must be a part of a concerted practice/agreement or take a 
decision which could affect trade and have as effect the prevention, restriction, or 
distortion of the market. In this regard, it is important to understand the concept of 
“agreement” and the broad interpretation that it has been given by the EU institutions (as 
the concept is not defined in the Treaties). 
In several cases, the CJEU has used the expression “joint intention” to describe its 
understanding of the term agreement.110 As such, considering the European sports 
structure, it is clear that this concept is applicable to the sports market in the EU. 
Nevertheless, as Lindholm stated, it is not crucial for the application of Article 101(1) 
TFEU that a soft/hard salary cap is imposed by an agreement.111 Any “decision” to impose 
a soft/hard salary cap would have its effects considered under EU Competition Law as 
well.112 
4.3.2.1.3. Relevant Market 
Defining both the “relevant product market” and the “relevant geographic market” is 
also mandatory to any Competition Law assessment, in light of EU law. This has been 
acknowledged several times in the past by different European and national courts. In its 
“Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition 
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Law” (“Notice”), the European Commission has provided the following definition for 
“relevant product market”: “Relevant product market comprises all those products and/or 
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason 
of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use”.113 
In this regard, the Notice emphasizes the “substitutability” criterion to define the 
relevant product market. A question to consider is whether this definition applies to 
football players and whether a “substitutability” criterion would also be applicable. 
Richard Parrish considers three different markets to exist for sports: “the exploitation 
market”, “the contest market” and the “supply market”.114 FFPR have an undeniable effect 
and are deeply connected to the “supply market”. 
In the same Notice, a definition for “relevant geographic market” is also provided: 
“The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned 
are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those 
area”.115 
As Parrish has stated, “the definition of the geographical market flows from that of 
the product market”.116 The author considers that “it is difficult to argue against the whole 
EU being considered the relevant geographical market for agreements concerning the sale 
of broadcasting rights, rules on international transfer and even ticketing arrangements for 
major international sporting events such as the football World Cup”.117 As such, one can 
conclude that the relevant geographic market in this regard includes all EU Member States. 
Having defined both the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market, 
one must combine both to establish the relevant market. The same is explicit in the 
definition stipulated in the Notice: ”The relevant market within which to assess a given 
competition issue is therefore established by the combination of the product and 
geographic markets. The Commission interprets the definition in paragraphs 7 and 8 
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(which reflect the case-law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance as well as 
its own decision-making practice) according to the orientations defined in this notice”.118 
The assessment of the relevant market is a mandatory step to finally understand 
whether an agreement will result in a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU and whether an 
exception developed by the CJEU or Article 101(3) TFEU could eventually apply. 
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that the General Court has stated in 
Lombard Club
119 that the importance of defining the relevant market is different in Article 
101 TFEU when compared to Article 102 TFEU. In Lombard Club, the Commission 
imposed millionaire fines on eight Austrian banks for participating in a price-fixing 
agreement, which constituted a cartel. The General Court (at the time, in 2002, the Court of 
First Instance) largely upheld the sanctions. In this case, a very wide definition for the 
relevant market was adopted which made it possible to apply sanctions to the various 
banks involved. As such, one should embrace this broad definition of market when 
applying it in an eventual breach of Article 101(1) related to the sports industry. 
4.3.2.1.4. Object or Effect the Prevention, Restriction or Distortion of Competition 
within the Internal Market 
It is now important to assess whether the break-even rule would have as its “object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market”.120 
First of all, as Lindholm affirmed, the elimination of competition in football is not a major 
concern in the sports industry.121 This results from the obvious need for a competition, as 
well as the fact that richer clubs can certainly benefit from the existence of smaller 
clubs.122 
Several case law has helped to conclude that salary caps most likely have an anti-
competitive effect on the sports market in the EU. An anti-competitive object, on the other 
hand, should be reserved for cases which inherently present a very high degree of harm and 
impact on the market.123 While the collusive behavior of clubs when adopting a salary cap 
might not have as its object to obtain a maximum profit, as it happens in several other 
cases of breaches of EU Competition Law, the truth is that, due to the very specific nature 
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of sports, their behavior will affect prices and subsequently the market, in what can 
considered to be price fixing. The interesting nuance in this regard, as we have previously 
assessed, is that salary caps can take different forms and produce different effects 
according to their intent and how they are introduced in a professional league. In this 
regard, as Advocate General Wahl stated, in a situation where not the object but the effects 
of the measure are being assessed, the intent by the undertakings involved should not be 
the main concern.124 
One should conclude in this regard that the type of salary cap introduced will 
produce a unique effect which must be considered in a case-by-case assessment.125 
Nevertheless, and even if FFPR can avoid having an anti-competitive object, it will surely 
not be able to avoid having an anti-competitive effect. While there are different opinions 
on whether FFPR have an anticompetitive object, the truth is that, at least, these have an 
anticompetitive effect, mainly because they are successful in reducing overall salaries cost. 
4.3.2.1.5. Appreciable Effect on Trade 
Another crucial feature of Article 101(1) TFEU is that it requires that there is an 
appreciable effect on trade between Member States. Again, the CJEU has provided some 
guidance in this regard, as well as the Commission on its “Notice on the effect of trade 
concept”126. Considering the European football market structure and the role of FIFA and 
UEFA on the decision-making process for European competitions, it is without a question 
of doubt that the introduction of the break-even requirement in the European professional 
football affects trade between Member States, as clubs from multiple Member States 
compete in these leagues. 
All the different types of salary caps have a strong cross-border effect on trade 
between Member States. As such, even in a scenario where a type of salary cap was to be 
adopted by a single national federation, that would still probably mean that there would be 
an appreciable effect on trade between Member States as any eventual player movement to 
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4.3.2.1.6. De Minimis Doctrine 
Finally, for Article 101(1) TFEU to apply, it is mandatory that the agreement or 
decision by an undertaking/association of undertakings has an appreciable effect on the 
market. The de minimis doctrine has been developed by the CJEU (as it goes beyond the 
wording of Article 101(1) TFEU) and has been stated on the Commission’s “Notice on 
agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”, presenting the 
following characteristics: “The Commission holds the view that agreements between 
undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which may have as their 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, do 
not appreciably restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Treaty: (a) 
if the aggregate market share held by the parties to the agreement does not exceed 10% on 
any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement, where the agreement is made 
between undertakings which are actual or potential competitors on any of those markets 
(agreements between competitors) (2); or (b) if the market share held by each of the parties 
to the agreement does not exceed 15% on any of the relevant markets affected by the 
agreement, where the agreement is made between undertakings which are not actual or 
potential competitors on any of those markets (agreements between non-competitors)”.127 
Several case law has also supported this doctrine.128 In this regard, when the 
undertakings/association of undertakings involved do not have a strong position in the 
market, that results in an insignificant effect on competition and thus any agreement or 
decision is considered to be out of the scope of Article 101 TFEU.129 Regarding FFPR, it is 
without a doubt that UEFA has a large share in the relevant market and for that reason 
there is certainly an appreciable effect on competition and thus the de minimis doctrine is 
not applicable. As such, the introduction of the break-even rule necessarily has an 
appreciable effect on the market. 
One should consequently conclude that FFPR appear to be under the scope of Article 
101(1) TFEU. 
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4.3.2.2. Article 102 TFEU 
Regarding Article 102 TFEU, enacted to prevent the abuse of a dominant position, 
one could say that the typical structure for FIFA, UEFA, and football clubs could set the 
ground for a possible legal challenge for anti-competitive reasons. The main reason is that 
UEFA is the only entity in Europe allowed to enact regulations for professional football, 
such as the FFPR, or to provide rules and guidelines to the different national leagues. 
Nevertheless, scholars tend to agree that UEFA’s behavior would hardly be considered as 
an abuse of a dominant position, mostly due to the importance that clubs have on the 
decision-making processes.130 
Craig and de Búrca consider that there are two types of situations covered by Article 
102 TFEU: “exploitative abuses” and “exclusionary abuses”. While an “exploitative 
abuse” refers to a behavior which is harmful to consumers, an “exclusionary abuse” 
consists in a behavior which injures other competitors.131 As the authors have also stated, 
the list of abusive practices under Article 102 TFEU is not extensive. Lindholm has stated 
in this regard that the FFPR do not fall under any of these categories nor fit the examples 
of abuses provided in Article 102 TFEU. The author states that salary caps (such as the 
break-even rule) “only injure players, not competitors or consumers, and they do not 
belong to the class of persons protected by Article 102 TFEU”.132 Also, in Advocate 
General Lenz’s opinion in Bosman, players do not belong to the class of competitors, 
customers or consumers. Instead, he believes that “only the relationship between the clubs 
and their players is affected”, in this regard.133 
As such, it appears to be consensual among several scholars that the break-even rule, 
as well as other types of salary caps, should be excluded from the scope of Article 102 
TFEU. 
4.3.2.3. Are FFPR Mitigated by the Special Status of Lex Sportiva? 
As we have assessed, FFPR appear to fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
However, it is still necessary to assess if there is a breach of EU law or if FFPR are instead 
mitigated by the special status of lex sportiva. 
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In this regard, it is first important to look back at Albany134, a labor law case in which 
the CJEU considered the application of Article 101 TFEU to collective agreements 
between organizations representing employers and workers. In that regard, the CJEU ruled 
that it was beyond question that certain restrictions of competition were “inherent in 
collective agreements between organizations representing employers and workers”.135 
However, the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously 
undermined if management and labor were subject to Article 101(1) TFEU “when seeking 
jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work employment”.136 As Weatherill 
stated, this decision has stood up to the idea that EU law is to be interpreted with 
“contextual nuance”, which would help the case for sports entities.137 
However, specifically in Albany, the key elements to the case related to collective 
actions and work conditions are missing from the FFPR, which means that UEFA cannot 
clearly apply Albany’s reasoning to sustain its position. Nevertheless, it could somehow be 
taken in consideration in a future legal assessment. 
4.3.2.3.1 The Regulatory Ancillarity Doctrine 
Wouters is extremely important to be taken in consideration by UEFA.138 In Wouters, 
a landmark EU law case, the CJEU ruled that not every agreement restricting the freedom 
of action of the parties would necessarily be in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU, as the 
objectives of the assessed measure have to be taken in consideration. As Weatherill stated, 
the case concerned “rules prohibiting multi-disciplinary partnerships between members of 
the Bar and accountants”.139 In its ruling, the CJEU developed the “regulatory ancillarity” 
doctrine, under which certain measures and objectives would benefit from an exemption to 
the strict rule of Article 101(1) TFEU, if they were to pass a three-tier test of “necessity”, 
“reasonability” and “proportionality”. Under the “regulatory ancillarity” doctrine, even 
when there is a breach of the express wording of Article 101(1) TFEU, an exemption could 
occur when it is reasonable to conclude that “despite the effects restrictive of competition 
that are inherent in it”, the measures are “necessary”.140 In Meca-Medina, a sports law 
dispute related to anti-doping rules, the CJEU applied the Wouters method to a sporting 
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context and determined that for the purposes of application of Article 101(1) TFEU to a 
particular case, one should consider the objectives of the decision (“necessity”). Then, one 
should consider “whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent 
in the pursuit of those objectives […] and are proportionate to them” (“reasonability” and 
“proportionality”).141 Only after applying this test, should one conclude if there is a breach 
of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
In Meca-Medina’s ruling, the CJEU concluded that the core objective of anti-doping 
rules was for competitive sports to be conducted fairly and ethically and that any sanctions 
that would affect “athletes’ freedom of action” were contextualized to the anti-doping rules 
itself.142 When applying the Wouters test, the CJEU found that the sporting rule in Meca-
Medina did not breach EU law.143 As such, just as Weatherill concluded, what was at stake 
was a restriction of competition compatible with EU law as it was justified by a legitimate 
purpose, inherent to the competitive nature of sports. In that scenario, only if the rules went 
beyond the necessary would an incompatibility with EU law prevail.144 
Regarding FFPR, Serby believes that these restrict competition and lack 
proportionality, although they have not yet been sanctioned by the EU institutions.145 In 
this regard, is still to be ruled whether FFPR are in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU or if 
they qualify for an exception. 
4.3.2.3.2. Article 101(3) TFEU 
The exemptions stipulated in Article 101(3) TFEU should also be taken in 
consideration. Under Article 101(3) TFEU, the provisions of Article 101(1) TFEU may be 
“declared inapplicable” when a measure contributes to improve “technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”, to the extent that 
it does not “impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable 
to the attainment of these objectives” and it does not “afford such understandings the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question”. 
While it seems unlikely that UEFA can prove that the current FFPR improve 
economic progress by allowing consumers a fair share of the benefit, as it is not considered 
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a core objective of FFPR, one should not discard this argument for a future challenge in 
court. Anyhow, Weatherill doubts that Article 101(3) could apply as an exception for the 
break-even rule.146 
Nevertheless, in the unlikely scenario that Article 101(3) TFEU was to qualify as an 
applicable exception for FFPR, that wouldn’t preclude these rules from still being under 
the scope of the free movement of workers’ rules, as it is further assessed. 
4.3.3. FFPR and the Free Movement of Workers 
Some critics also suggest (although not as strongly as with the breach of EU 
Competition Law) that FFPR could infringe the EU’s fundamental freedoms, namely the 
free movement of people (players)147, services (players’ agents)148 and capital.149 The focus 
of this section shall be the free movement of players, as it is the legal issue most scholars 
tend to raise. 
The rationale in this regard is generally simple to comprehend: the break-even rule, 
as a soft salary cap, will decrease the possibility of clubs to acquire new players as they 
will be strangled by the need to financially break-even. This will consequently and 
necessarily hinder the free movement of players throughout EU professional football 
leagues, when compared to the previous status quo. 
It is important to state that, in the US, Mackey has shown that hindering the free 
movement of players is part of the assessment of whether a breach of Antitrust Law has 
occurred.150 In the EU, hindering the free movement of players is an independent legal 
analysis under Article 45 TFEU, different from an eventual EU Competition Law breach. 
4.3.3.1. Definition of Worker According to EU Law 
To establish whether FFPR infringe Article 45 TFEU, players should be considered 
as “workers” according to the EU’s definition of the concept. As Craig and de Búrca have 
stated, although the term “worker” was left undefined in the Treaties, it has been shaped by 
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the CJEU throughout times.151 The CJEU itself has insisted that defining the concept of 
“worker” was a matter of EU law in order to avoid lack of consensus in this regard.152 
In this regard, there are no doubts whatsoever that players are to be considered as 
workers. Several case law has supported this in different sports and non-sports law 
cases.153 In summary, as Craig and de Búrca have assessed, “any person who pursues 
employment activities which are effective and genuine to the exclusion of activities on 
such a small scale as to be regarded as a ‘purely marginal and ancillary’ is to be treated as 
a worker. For an economic activity to qualify as employment under Article 45 rather than 
self-employment under Article 49 TFEU, there must be a relationship of subordination”. 
As such, players are to be considered as workers under EU law. 
4.3.3.2. Wholly Internal Issues of a Member State 
As assessed in Bosman, it is important to remind that Article 45 TFEU does not 
apply to a wholly internal issue of a Member State.154 However, for FFPR, it is not 
possible to isolate the rules for a single Member State and name it as “wholly internal 
matter” as the rules necessarily produce effect on the movement of players for the whole 
European market. 
As such, FFP Regulations appear to fall under the scope of Article 45 TFEU. 
4.3.3.3. Is There a Breach of Article 45 TFEU? 
In Bosman, the CJEU stated that “provisions which preclude or deter a national of a 
Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom 
of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they apply without 
regard to the nationality of the works concerned”.155 This means that even though FFPR do 
not directly discriminate on a basis of nationality, they constitute an obstacle to the free 
movement of players. 
Lehtonen provides a good understanding in this regard.156 In this case, the CJEU 
concluded that the Treaty precluded the application of sporting rules that prevented 
basketball players from moving from one club to another.157 Lehtonen was also relevant, 
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following Walrave and Bosman, as it clarified that the Treaty provisions on the free 
movement of workers applied not only to the action of public authorities, but as well as to 
any other rules regulating gainful employment and the provision of services in a collective 
manner.158 It was therefore concluded that the rules hindered the free movement of players, 
just as FFPR similarly appear to have the same effect on European football 
competitions.159 Thus, one should conclude that FFPR hinder the free movement of 
players. 
4.3.3.4. Could FFPR Constitute an Exception to the Free Movement of Workers 
Rule? 
The next question to be answered is whether there is a justification for the hindering 
of the free movement of players. Article 45 TFEU stipulates two exceptions to the free 
movement of workers rule. 
The first exception consists of “limitations justified on grounds of justified public 
policy, public security or public health”. None of these justifications apply to the break-
even rule or any other type of salary cap. 
The second exception is related to the notion of “general interest” developed in 
Gebhard.160 In this case, the CJEU defined the conditions under which an exemption could 
be applied to Article 45 TFEU: any measure must be justified by imperative requirements 
in the general interest, must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, must be suitable 
for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and must not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain it.161 This is a very similar test to the one applied in 
regard to EU Competition Law, so as to assess the “general interest”: any measures should 
again be “necessary”, “reasonable” and “proportional” if they are to be considered an 
exception to the application of Article 45 TFEU.162 In this regard, Mortelmans has 
concluded that there is a clear tendency for convergence between the provisions on free 
movement of workers and the competition rules.163 
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Again, it is extremely doubtful that the break-even rule would qualify for an 
exception in this regard. Firstly, it is not consensual that FFPR are suitable to achieve 
UEFA’s aim: they do not have the same legitimate purpose as mentioned in Bosman, as 
mentioned by the European Commission164 and as upheld by the CJEU. Secondly, it is far 
from proven that the break-even rule is necessary to achieve UEFA’s objectives of 
financial stability and competitive balance. For instance, the economic overinvestment 
theory, which UEFA considers in its assessment, hasn’t been proven as actually affecting 
the sustainability of clubs. 
Just as it occurs with the eventual breach of Article 101 TFEU, the CJEU is still to 
produce significant case law to clarify this issue. The solution adopted will depend on how 
the CJEU assesses the specificity of sports and if the CJEU considers that other measures 
could apply. Anyhow, Article 165 TFEU could be the savior for UEFA and its break-even 
rule on grounds of the specificity of sports. In Bernard, the CJEU has taken into 
consideration the specificity of sports regarding free movement.165 
Considering the abovementioned, it seems unlikely that the break-even rule could be 
deemed as necessary. 
4.3.4. How to Support the Legality of FFPR? 
To support the legality of FFPR and the autonomy of sports governance, an argument 
that could be used is that UEFA’s measures aim at achieving a better distribution of wealth 
within sports, and preventing financial irrationality and indiscipline, since clubs tend to 
spend money they do not own, which affects the integrity of sports – one of UEFA’s core 
objectives, one should recall. As Weatherill stated, Article 165 TFEU, in which for the first 
time a provision regarding sports and its structures’ competence was enacted, could 
support UEFA’s claim that FFPR are promoting “fairness”, even though a restriction on 
competition should nevertheless be acknowledged. However, it is also worth pointing that 
Weatherill believes that Article 165 is a mere reflection of the judicial practice.166 As such, 
its effectiveness is dubious. 
UEFA could also stand for the idea that some restrictions should be compatible with 
the Treaty, since they could be the best option to pursue legitimate goals. However, it is 
questionable that the CJEU will dramatically change its current decision-making reasoning 
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by giving a wider spectrum of autonomy for sports governing bodies. The CJEU has made 
it clear in several previous cases that EU law is applicable to sports governing bodies’ 
business decisions.167 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the CJEU slowly adapts to the specificities of sports 
and eventually applies the provision of Article 165 to exempt a sports entity’s legally 
doubtful decision that affects the EU internal market. FFPR, due to its very specific 
characteristics and goals, presents itself as a fine candidate for an eventual innovative 
doctrine of specificity in sports to be applied by the CJEU. 
4.3.5. FFPR and the European Commission’s Position 
The European Commission’s position has been deemed as especially important due 
to its certain degree of autonomy in developing competition policies in the EU’s sports 
field. 
Over the last few years, the European Commission has seemingly been supportive of 
FFPR, as it is possible to assess by analyzing Barnier’s position in representation of the 
Commission while answering to a Parliamentary Question in August 2010168, by the joint 
statement of Almunia and Platini, in 2012169 and by the “Arrangement for Cooperation”, 
signed by UEFA and the Commission on February 2018170, which, overall, praised FFPR. 
As Geoff Pearson correctly asserted “the football ‘transfer system’ has been the focus of 
both the CJEU and the European Commission on several occasions, but despite a number 
of threats and rulings of incompatibility the restrictions persist and in some cases have 
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4.3.6. Legal Challenges to the FFPR 
4.3.6.1. The Striani Challenge 
So far, there have been two significant strikes to the FFPR. The first significant strike 
to the FFPR occurred with the so-called Striani challenge.172 In 2013, Daniel Striani, an 
Italian players’ agent, lodged a complaint under the Commission alleging that the FFPR 
did not comply with EU law. The lawyer who represented Striani was Jean-Louis Dupont, 
who mainly gained his reputation after acting in Bosman. Striani sought Dupont’s 
representation as he has repeatedly stated that he doubts FFPR’s legality, in light of EU 
law.173 
As Flanagan assessed, in his complaint, Striani has identified five anti-competitive 
effects of the break-even requirement (eventual breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU).174 
Firstly, according to Striani, FFPR restrict external investments. Secondly, it calcifies the 
hierarchy of the game, preventing smaller clubs to achieve high competitive levels – thus 
resulting in a fossilization of the market structure (top clubs are to maintain or increase 
their dominance). Thirdly, it depresses the transfer market, resulting in a reduction of the 
number of transfers and the transfer amounts. Fourthly, it negatively affects players’ 
wages. Finally, as a consequence of a transfer market depression, it reduces the revenue for 
players’ agents. Also, according to Striani, FFPR infringe the rules on the free movement 
of people175, services176 and capital.177 To Striani, UEFA’s objective of long-term financial 
stability of clubs does not justify the existence of these regulations. However, in 2014, the 
Commission’s DG Competition rejected Striani’s complaint, upholding FFPR. 
This dispute was also ruled by the Belgian Court of First Instance, in 2013, and 
considered by several FFPR’s critics as a victory. The reason was that the Brussels Court 
decided to refer the case to the CJEU, as well as to impose an interim measure that 
prevented UEFA from implementing the second phase of its FFPR – which involved a 
reduction on the allowed deficit for clubs – by invoking Article 31 of the Lugano 
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Convention.178 This was clearly an easy way out by the Brussels Court, or even an 
“example of legal fiction”, as called by Ben Van Rompuy, since the Court appears to be 
contradicting itself.179 On one hand, it reasons its ruling on formal grounds. On the other 
hand, it grants provisional measures and refers the case to the CJEU, after considering 
itself to be incompetent to rule due to the lack of jurisdiction. 
In its ruling, the CJEU rejected the referral by considering it inadmissible because 
the necessary information to address the legal issues at stake had not been provided and 
therefore it was unable to rule on the substantive matters.  
4.3.6.2. Galatasaray v. UEFA 
A second challenge to the legality of FFPR was initiated by Galatasaray S.K. 
(“Galatasaray”), in the landmark case Galatasaray v. UEFA.180 Quite unsurprisingly, 
Galatasaray chose Dupont to represent them, as the case was again on a possible breach of 
competition law and/or on EU’s fundamental freedoms. 
On a decision from the 2nd of March 2016, the CFCB’s Adjudicatory Chamber 
concluded that Galatasaray S.K. had failed to comply with the terms of the previously 
settled agreement and decided to impose on the club “an exclusion from participating in 
the next UEFA club competition for which it would otherwise qualify in the next two (2) 
seasons (i.e. the 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 seasons)”, as well as it ordered the club “to 
limit the overall aggregate cost of the employee benefits expenses of all of its players in 
each of the next two reporting periods to a maximum of sixty-five million Euros 
(€65,000,000)”.181 This was considered to be an aggressive enforcement of the FFPR, to 
which Galatasaray reacted by appealing to the CAS, arguing that the sanctions were illegal 
as the rules on which they were based (FFPR) were as well illegal. The arguments used by 
both sides were basically the same used in the past: the issue at stake was whether there 
was a breach of competition law and/or a breach of the right to the free movement of 
workers. 
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In its ruling, the CAS panel upheld the CFCB’s decision: a major victory for UEFA 
and its FFPR was achieved. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that both the Striani 
challenge and Galatasaray v. UEFA demonstrate that the basic legal grounds for future 
challenges on FFPR have been set (both on procedural and substantive grounds) and 
UEFA itself has acknowledged it by providing a more flexible approach to the rules in the 
recent years – to avoid possible upcoming legal challenges. 
In the future, a different approach may be required and a hard salary cap could 
eventually be a part of that approach as a more proportional alternative. 
5. HARD SALARY CAP AND THE COMPATIBILITY WITH EUROPEAN LAW 
It is important to be clear when providing a legal analysis of the eventual 
introduction of any type of salary cap in European football, considering EU law: it isn’t 
possible to provide any legal certainty on whether a salary cap would be deemed legal or in 
breach of EU law. The main reason is that the EU institutions - in this regard, necessarily 
the CJEU - have not pronounced themselves on the most relevant substantive issues which 
will help to define the path for the EU’s sports policy. 
While legal certainty is not possible to provide at this stage, one can assess whether it 
would be likely that the CJEU was to deem hard salary caps as legal, at least when 
compared to the currently existing FFPR. That is the proposed assessment in this chapter. 
5.1. What Would a Hard Salary Cap Add to the Current FFPR? 
As Parrish has stated, salary caps are by their own definition restrictive and 
depending on the form they take they restrict the amount clubs spend on wages and thus 
the supply and demand for players.182 
On one hand, introducing a hard salary cap could certainly still contribute to improve 
the economy of professional clubs and prevent the increase of debt for European clubs, just 
as the current break-even requirement does. On the other hand, a hard salary cap would 
certainly be more effective in improving competitive balance in the European professional 
football leagues than the current break-even rule.183 This is the reasoning usually adopted 
in the US to justify the existence of salary caps: both upholding financial stability in 
professional leagues and limiting clubs’ wage costs, yet promoting competitive balance. 
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Nevertheless, as previously assessed, one should not categorize the typical US salary 
caps as hard, but instead as soft, due to the several exceptions applicable in the different 
leagues. It is therefore controversial that salaries caps, as they stand in the US, do improve 
competitive balance. 
As assessed, the break-even rule produces the effects of a soft type of salary cap. To 
sustain FFPR’s legality in future legal challenges, an analysis of possible alternatives to 
prevent overinvestment by clubs must be pursued. As Serby stated, the hard salary cap is 
an obvious alternative to the soft salary cap of the break-even rule.184 Hard salary caps 
contribute directly both for clubs to maintain solvency and for competitive balance within 
leagues.185 A hard salary cap would limit the wages paid to athletes by a club, 
independently of the club’s financial balance, with no exceptions applicable. 
Both maintaining financial stability for clubs and promoting competitive balance 
have been deemed as crucial features for the application of an eventual exemption to EU 
law. In a 2010 study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and 
Education, several acknowledged sports law scholars have discussed the eventual 
introduction of a hard salary cap.186 These scholars have concluded that a hard cap “whilst 
imposing a much greater restriction on commercial freedom than a soft cap, is more likely 
to find favor in EU competition law”.187 They justify this statement by considering that “a 
soft cap may be insufficient to correct competitive imbalance as it disproportionately 
affects the ability of small clubs to improve their position”.188 
Nicolas Petit has classified the existing relationship between elite European football 
clubs, in light of FFPR, as a cartel and an “oligopoleague” between the richest clubs within 
UEFA competitions.189 As such, bigger clubs are still able to invest more than smaller 
clubs, thus maintaining or even likely increasing the financial and competitive 
disparities.190 A hard salary cap would create a flat ceiling on the amounts of money spent 
by clubs, therefore contributing to a fairer distribution of revenues between clubs, 
improving financial results and competitive balance both for clubs and professional 
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leagues. Serby considers the hard salary cap to be a valid alternative to the current break-
even rule, promoting a fairer competition.191 
It therefore seems likely that introducing a hard salary cap would be an effective 
replacement to the current break-even rule so as to pursue UEFA’s legitimate objectives. 
5.2. A Bipartite EU Law Issue 
A question to be answered is whether a hard salary cap would be deemed legal by 
EU law. In its White Paper on Sport, the European Commission considered that the legality 
of the use of a salary cap model has yet to be determined, as courts have not yet ruled on 
substantive grounds in this regard.192 That position remains intact as of today. 
Nevertheless, in fact, salary caps have been legitimized by some European countries. In 
France, for instance, Article L.131-16 of the French Sports Code expressly permits the use 
of salary caps (introduced by Law no. 2012-158, dated 1st of February 2012). 
The answer to whether a hard salary cap would be deemed legal by EU law must 
pursue the same line of reasoning previously assessed in this work for the break-even rule: 
both a competition law analysis and a free movement of workers’ analysis is required. 
In this regard, as stated by Parrish et al., “a cap is inherently collusive”.193 As such, a 
hard salary cap will necessarily be restrictive for the market. For that reason, just as it 
occurs with the break-even rule, the same line of reasoning will lead to the conclusion that 
a hard salary cap is both under the scope of Articles 45 and 101(1) TFEU. 
The question to be answered is how would a hard salary cap react when faced with 
the three-tier assessment of “necessity”, “reasonability” and “proportionality”. Following 
the CJEU’s case law, a strong case could be made for a hard salary cap to be considered 
inherent in ensuring the economic viability of clubs competing in a league, while 
preserving and fostering competitive balance, as well as promoting the development of 
young players at the same time. In such a scenario, it would more like qualify for an 
exception under EU law when compared to the break-even rule. 
Nevertheless, in light of EU law, it seems clear that no legal certainty regarding 
salary caps can be provided at this point. One should bear in mind that both the break-even 
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rule, as a soft type of salary cap, as well a hard salary cap, are possibly in breach of EU 
law. 
In an interesting study from 2014, Grégory Basnier analyzed the benefits of 
introducing a hard salary cap in the New Zealand professional rugby league.194 The 
Commerce Commission, New Zealand’s Competition Authority, concluded that the 
benefits of introducing a hard salary cap exceeded the negative anti-competitive effects and 
that a hard salary cap would promote competitive balance. As Basnier assessed regarding 
the substantive rules on competition, “the structure of the provisions applicable in New 
Zealand regarding anticompetitive agreements is similar to that of article 101 TFEU 
(prohibition principle/possibility of exemption)”.195 However, the author also notes that the 
decisions involved should be assessed under the specific background of New Zealand’s 
Law and that several core differences between the legal systems prevail. Nevertheless, this 
study could somehow be taken in consideration by the EU institutions and UEFA to 
illustrate the potential of successfully introducing a hard salary cap. 
Both hard and soft salary caps restrict competition and the free movement of 
workers. In this regard, the more exceptions a salary cap has – the softer it is -, the harder it 
will be to support its legality. Lindholm has stated that a hard salary cap will more easily 
be conceivable in a legal assessment than a soft salary cap.196 A soft salary cap is surely 
not necessary to improve competitive balance, as the richer clubs are still able to acquire 
the rights for the best players (richer clubs can still afford to spend a large amount of their 
revenues in players’ salaries) and consequently present the best sportive outcomes. As 
such, it is highly doubtful that competitive balance is achieved through a soft salary cap, 
such as the current break-even rule. For instance, regarding the G14 (organization of 14 
(18 since 2002) leading European Football Clubs from 2000 to 2008) failed proposal to 
implement a soft salary cap, Stefan Kesenne has proven through an economic assessment 
that the proposed salary cap would have a negative impact and worsen competitive balance 
for most European professional football leagues.197 
For that reason, a hard salary cap could more easily be justified under EU law and 
pass the three-tier test of “necessity”, “reasonability” and “proportionality”, grounded on 
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the doctrine of the specificity of sports, as it is more effective in pursuing the underlying 
UEFA’s legitimate objectives, by preventing overspending and by forcing clubs to be more 
selective when acquiring players and spending their revenues. 198 
In the end, I believe that the answer is economic-based. However, Article 165 TFEU 
will certainly have a special importance in the outcome of an eventual CJEU’s ruling on 
substantive grounds which will mark a path for the EU sports policy. 
5.3. Lex Sportiva Prevailing over EU Law: a Matter of Exemptions for Salary Caps 
In Bosman, the CJEU acknowledged the sui generis characteristics of sports and that 
both competitive balance and financial stability were legitimate aims to pursue.199 As 
assessed, FFPR do not currently improve competitive balance. However, it is far from 
certain that the CJEU would not recognize the benefits of the break-even rule in an 
innovative doctrine. Weatherill believes that it has not been demonstrated that other 
measures would be as effective as the FFPR in introducing more rationality in clubs’ 
finances.200 Also, the CJEU is likely to agree or at least highly take in consideration the 
Commission’s position regarding the sports policy for the EU. In this regard, Parrish 
concluded that the Commission has widely supported FFPR.201 
Nevertheless, as concluded, a legitimate aim is not sufficient to justify the legality of 
a salary cap. The measure at stake still needs to be deemed as “necessary”, “reasonable” 
and “proportional”. As such, the major question for an exemption to apply to a soft or a 
hard salary cap is how far would the CJEU be willing to take the special status of lex 
sportiva, when facing EU law. I believe that in this assessment relies a major part of the 
future for the EU sports policy. In this regard, Weatherill considers that UEFA’s best 
approach would be to invoke the special status of lex sportiva and the expertise of sports 
governing bodies, while still not denying the application of EU law.202 Serby considers 
unlikely that UEFA will be able to sustain its position on the current FFPR when facing a 
future legal challenge on a court that rules on substantive grounds.203 
In the EU, it could be worth taking a deep insight at the legal effects of a CBA in 
sports. The CJEU has stated in Albany that it was beyond question that certain restrictions 
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of competition were inherent to collective agreements between organizations representing 
employers and workers. However, the social policy objectives pursued by such agreement 
would be seriously undermined if management and labor were subject to Article 101(1) 
TFEU when pursuing jointly measures to improve conditions of work and employment.  
In Bosman, Advocate General Lenz stated that “it would be possible to determine by 
a collective wage agreement specified limits for the salaries to be paid to the players by the 
clubs”.204 Also, in Brentjens, the CJEU stated that collective labor agreements could be out 
of the scope of EU Competition Law if the social partners proved that the agreement 
improved employment and labor conditions for those covered by the agreement.205 As 
such, Article 101(1) TFEU is not applicable to CBAs that have been agreed between 
workers and employers who intend to improve working conditions and the social policy in 
Europe.  
Also, it should be concluded from Albany that the provisions set in a CBA are not 
automatically exempted from EU Competition Law. For an exemption to be applicable, the 
whole agreement must have a strong social intent in improving working conditions. 
Lindholm makes a relevant point when affirming that it “might be possible to shield” 
FFPR from a challenge on the basis of Article 101(1) TFEU by including the regulations 
on a CBA, as typically performed in the US. However, the author also acknowledges two 
reasons why this would be unlikely. Firstly, it would be necessary for clubs to concert their 
action in this regard, which is extremely improbable to occur. Secondly, even if an unlikely 
exemption was achieved under the scope of EU Competition Law, there would still be 
space for a challenge under Article 45 TFEU, for a possible restriction of the free 
movement of workers.206 
As such, the CJEU’s “regulatory ancillarity” doctrine, applied in a case-by-case 
assessment, appears to be the only possible reasoning for sustaining the legality of salary 
caps. Due to the current legal uncertainty, the CJEU’s position in the future regarding the 
special status of lex sportiva could be the path for the introduction of a generally more 
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6. PERSONAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Salary caps can take several forms and exist in different sports structures. From an 
economic perspective, the positive impact of the break-even rule, usually deemed a soft 
type of salary cap, is questionable. Also, in light of EU law, it is without a question that the 
legality of the current break-even rule is very doubtful. 
A few conclusions could be taken in this regard. Firstly, the financial impact that 
FFPR has on European clubs and competitions is seemingly enormous. The break-even 
rule forces clubs to be more rational when spending money, which necessarily affects 
players’ salaries. FFPR have the effect of setting a limit between clubs’ owners on what 
they pay to players. This is surely a negative consequence for players, as both the 
competition to acquire their rights and pay their wages are hindered. 
Secondly, it has not been proven that FFPR have a positive impact on competitive 
balance, a legitimate goal for UEFA to pursue. In contrary, previously mentioned studies 
have shown that the current break-even rule increases the gap between the richer and the 
poorer clubs. 
Thirdly, the applicable sanctions to clubs who breach FFPR raise questions regarding 
its efficiency. For instance, even though Paris Saint-Germain FC and Manchester City FC 
have been fined for their breach of the regulations, that hasn’t prevented them from 
increasing their dominance in the European football competitions. As such, stricter 
sanctions should be applicable to clubs who don’t comply with the regulations to deter 
their non-compliant behaviors. 
From a legal perspective, I believe that the objectives proposed by the current FFPR 
do not justify its legality under EU law, considering the path that the CJEU has taken in the 
past. As Weatherill explained, football clubs do survive when they have high levels of 
debt, as there is always someone interested in them.207 Instead, what could happen is that a 
club continues to exist under a different corporate form. Also, FFPR have a negative 
impact on competitive balance. Therefore, I agree that the current FFPR are not 
sufficiently well justified to be exempted from the scope of EU law, both from a financial 
perspective and a competitive balance perspective. 
                                                      





Another question to be answered is whether introducing a hard salary cap would be 
deemed as legal, in light of EU law, at least when compared to the current break-even rule. 
This thesis has provided two important answers in this regard. 
Firstly, the US types of salary caps, usually conceptualized as hard salary caps, are in 
fact soft salary caps due to the various exemptions they foresee. While it is true that the 
different assessed salary caps could be considered “harder” than the current break-even 
rule, as a soft type of salary cap, the truth is that introducing a truly hard salary cap would 
be a unique experience for the European football structure, different from the US one. 
Secondly, it has been concluded that a hard salary cap would more easily qualify for 
an exemption under EU law than a soft salary cap. The reason is that the hard salary cap 
would more likely survive the “necessity”, “reasonability” and “proportionality” 
assessment. In this regard, it is undeniable that both soft and hard salary caps have a 
collusive effect on the market as they lower the cost price of players and their salaries. 
However, it is likely that the doctrine on the specificity of sports will more easily exempt 
hard salary caps from a breach of EU law. One could conclude that the benefits of 
introducing a hard salary cap, according to UEFA’s objectives and the legitimate goals, 
tolerated in the past by the EU authorities, could outweigh the negative impact on the free 
market and so may well be justified under EU law. 
The current FFPR raise serious concerns of compliance with EU law, and the 
outcome of a future CJEU’s decision is difficult to predict due to the inconsistency 
presented in previous decisions.208 At this stage, one can surely affirm that once again the 
special status of lex sportiva and the adjacent autonomy of UEFA in its role in sports 
governance are under challenge. If, and when, this matter reaches the CJEU, it will have to 
be ruled whether European football is special enough to admit arrangements such as salary 
caps, which restrict competition and hinder the free movement of players. An eventual 
decision by the CJEU will also be interesting to assess in light of Article 165 TFEU, which 
introduces the concepts of “fairness” and “openness”. These concepts are seemingly 
vacuous and at the convenience of the CJEU for the interpretation that is found to be more 
suitable for the EU’s interests. 
Due to the unique structure of European football, it would be unexpected if clubs, 
FIFA and UEFA were to promote the introduction of a hard salary cap. Some authors have 
                                                      
208 This inconsistency is present in the arguments for the decisions taken in a line of cases involving Walrave, 





suggested that other alternatives could as well prove to be effective to pursue UEFA’s 
goals and more likely comply with the requirements of EU law. For instance, Serby and 
Dupont believe that the simple measure of introducing a bank guarantee requirement to 
secure debt could prevent insolvency for clubs. When compared to the current break-even 
rule, such a measure would certainly not have such an impact on competition and on the 
free movement of players. As such, it would be a better candidate to qualify for an 
exemption under EU law than any type of salary cap. 
To conclude, legal realists would surely agree that settling the ongoing legal issue 
will truly be a matter of policy. Will the CJEU be sympathetic towards the interests of 
sports governing bodies, bearing in consideration the special status of lex sportiva? Or, on 
the other hand, will the CJEU focus on a pure and strict application of the provisions and 
case law of EU law? Whatever attitude the CJEU adopts will unquestionably influence its 
decision. Personally, I suspect that the former question will be the most likely to occur, as 
the CJEU has provided a line of reasoning in the past that tends to acknowledge the special 
status of lex sportiva. However, due to the uncertainty in this regard, we will have to 
patiently wait either until the CJEU rules this issue on substantive grounds or until UEFA 
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